On Prejudice.
1. It is to speculative people, fond of novel doctrines, and who, by accustoming
themselves to make the most fundamental truths the subject of discussion, have
divested their minds of that reverence which is generally felt for opinions and
practices of long standing, that the world is ever to look for its improvement or
reformation. But it is also these speculatists who introduce into it absurdities and
errors, more gross than any which have been established by that common consent of
numerous individuals, which opinions long acted upon must have required for their
basis. For systems of the latter class must at least possess one property, -- that
of being practicable; and there is likewise a presumption that they are, or at least
originally were, useful; whereas the opinions of the speculatist may turn out to be
utterly incongruous and eccentric. The speculatist may invent machines which it is
impossible to put in action, or which, when put in action, may possess the
tremendous power of tearing up society by the roots. Like the chemist, he is not
sure in the
moment of projection whether he shall blow up his own
dwelling and that of his neighbour, or whether he shall be rewarded with a discovery
which will secure the health and prolong the existence of future generations. It
becomes us, therefore, to examine with peculiar care those maxims which, under the
appearance of following a closer train of reasoning, militate against the usual
practices or genuine feelings of mankind. No subject has been more canvassed than
education. With regard to that important object, there is a maxim avowed by many
sensible people, which seems to me to deserve investigation. "Give your
child," it is said, "no prejudices: let reason be the
only foundation of his opinions; where he cannot reason, let him suspend his belief.
Let your great care be, that as he grows up he has nothing to unlearn; and never
make use of authority in matters of opinion, for authority is no test of
truth." The maxim sounds well, and flatters perhaps the secret pride of
man, in supposing him more the creature of reason than he really is; but, I suspect,
on examination we shall find it exceedingly fallacious. We must first consider what
a prejudice is. A prejudice is a sentiment in favour or disfavour of
any person, practice, or opinion, previous to and independent of examining their
merits by reason and investigation. Prejudice is pre-judging; that is, judging
previously to evidence. It is therefore sufficiently apparent, that no
philosophical belief can be founded on mere prejudice; because it
is the business of philosophy to go deep into the nature and
properties of things: nor can it be allowable for those to indulge prejudice who
aspire to lead the public opinion; those to whom the high office is appointed of
sifting truth from error, of canvassing the claims of different systems, of
exploding old and introducing new tenets. These must investigate with a kind of
audacious boldness every subject that comes before them; these, neither imprest with
awe for all that mankind have been taught to reverence, nor swayed by affection for
whatever the sympathies of our nature incline us to love, must hold the balance with
a severe and steady hand, while they are weighing the doubtful scale of
probabilities; and with a stoical apathy of mind, yield their assent to nothing by a
preponderance of evidence. But is this an office for a child? Is it an office for
more than one or two men in a century? And is it desirable that a child should grow
up without opinions to regulate his conduct, till he is able to form them fairly by
the exercise of his own abilities? Such an exercise requires at least the sober
period of matured reason: reason not only sharpened by argumentative discussion, but
informed by experience. The most sprightly child can only possess the
former; for let it be remembered, that though the reasoning powers put forth pretty
early in life, the faculty of using them to effect does not come till much later.
The first efforts of a child in reasoning resemble those quick and desultory motions
by which he gains the play of his limbs; they show agility and grace, they are
pleasing to look at, and necessary for the gradual acquirement of his bodily powers;
but his joints must be knit into more firmness, and his movements regulated with
more precision, before he is capable of useful labour and manly exertion. A
reasoning child is not yet a reasonable being. There is a great propriety in the
legal phraseology which expresses maturity, not by having arrived at the possession
of reason, but of that power, the late result of information, thought, and
experience -- discretion, which alone teaches, with regard to reason, its powers,
its limits, and its use. This the child of the most sprightly parts cannot have; and
therefore his attempts at reasoning, whatever acuteness they may show, and how much
soever they may please a parent with the early promise of future excellence, are of
no account whatever in the sober search after truth. Besides, taking it for granted
(which however is utterly impossible) that a youth could be brought up to the age of
fifteen or sixteen without prejudice in favour of any opinions whatever, and that he
is then set to examine for himself some important proposition, -- how
is he to set about it? Who is to recommend books to him? Who is to give him the
previous information necessary to comprehend the question? Who is to tell him
whether or no it is important? Whoever does these will infallibly lay a bias upon
his mind according to the ideas he himself has received upon the subject. Let us
suppose the point in debate was the preference between the Roman catholic and
protestant modes of religion. Can a youth in a protestant country, born of
protestant parents, with access, probably, to hardly a single controversial book on
the Roman catholic side of the question, -- can such a one study the subject without
prejudice? His knowledge of history, if he has such knowledge, must, according to
the books he has read, have already given him a prejudice on the one side or the
other; so must the occasional conversation he has been witness to, the appellations
he has heard used, the tone of voice with which he has heard the words monk or
priest pronounced, and a thousand other evanescent circumstances. It is likewise to
be observed, that every question of any weight and importance has numerous
dependencies and points of connexion with other subjects, which make it impossible
to enter upon the consideration of it without a great variety of previous knowledge.
There is no object of investi- gation perfectly insulated; -- we must
not conceive therefore of a man's sitting down to it with a mind perfectly new and
untutored: he must have passed more or less through a course of studies; and,
according to the colour of those studies, his mind will have received a tincture, --
that is, a prejudice. -- But it is, in truth, the most absurd of all suppositions,
that a human being can be educated, or even nourished and brought up, without
imbibing numberless prejudices from every thing which passes around him. A child
cannot learn the signification of words without receiving ideas along with them; he
cannot be impressed with affection to his parents and those about him, without
conceiving a predilection for their tastes, opinions, and practices. He forms
numberless associations of pain or pleasure, and every association begets a
prejudice; he sees objects from a particular spot, and his views of things are
contracted or extended according to his position in society: as no two individuals
can have the same horizon, so neither can any two have the same associations; and
different associations will produce different opinions, as necessarily as, by the
laws of perspective, different distances will produce different appearances of
visible objects. Let us confess a truth, humiliating perhaps to human pride; -- a
very small part only of the opinions of the coolest philosopher are the result of
fair reasoning; the rest are formed by his education, his temperament,
by the age in which he lives, by trains of thought directed to a particular track
through some accidental association -- in short, by prejudice. But why,
after all, should we wish to bring up children without prejudices? A child has
occasion to act, long before he can reason. Shall we leave him destitute of all the
principles that should regulate his conduct, till he can discover them by the
strength of his own genius? If it were possible that one whole generation could be
brought up without prejudices, the world must return to the infancy of knowledge,
and all the beautiful fabric which has been built up by successive generations must
be begun again from the very foundation. Your child has a claim to the advantage of
your experience, which it would be cruel and unjust to deprive him of. Will any
father say to his son, "My dear child, you are entering upon a world full
of intricate and perplexed paths, in which many miss their way, to their final
misery and ruin. Amidst many false systems, and much vain science, there is also
some true knowledge; there is a right path: I believe I know it, for I have the
advantage of years and experience, but I will instil no prejudices into your mind; I
shall therefore leave you to find it out as you can; whether your abilities are
great or small, you must take the chance of them. There are various
systems in morals; I have examined and found some of a good, others of a bad
tendency. There is such a thing as religion; many people think it the most important
concern of life: perhaps I am one of them: perhaps I have chosen from amidst the
various systems of belief, -- many of which are extremely absurd, and some even
pernicious, -- that which I cherish as the guide of my life, my comfort in all my
sorrows, and the foundation of my dearest hopes: but far be it from me to influence
you in any manner to receive it; when you are grown up, you must read all the books
upon these subjects which you can lay your hands on, for neither in the choice of
these would I presume to prejudice your mind: converse with all who pretend to any
opinions upon the subject; and whatever happens to be the result, you must abide by
it. In the mean time, concerning these important objects you must keep your mind in
a perfect equilibrium. It is true you want these principles more now than you can do
at any other period of your life; but I had rather you never had them at all, than
that you should not come fairly by them." Should we commend the wisdom or
the kindness of such a parent? The parent will perhaps plead in his behalf, that it
is by no means his intention to leave the mind of his child in the uncultivated
state I have supposed. As soon as his understanding begins to open, he
means to discuss with him those propositions on which he wishes him to form an
opinion. He will make him read the best books on the subject, and by free
conversation and explaining the arguments on both sides, he does not doubt but the
youth will soon be enabled to judge satisfactorily for himself. I have no objection
to make against this mode of proceeding: as a mode of instruction, it
is certainly a very good one: but he must know little of human nature, who thinks
that after this process the youth will be really in a capacity of judging for
himself, or that he is less under the dominion of prejudice than if he had received
the same truths from the mere authority of his parent; for most assuredly the
arguments on either side will not have been set before him with equal strength or
with equal warmth. The persuasive tone, the glowing language, the triumphant retort,
will all be reserved for the side on which the parent has formed his own
conclusions. It cannot be otherwise; he cannot be convinced himself of what he
thinks a truth without wishing to convey that conviction, nor without thinking all
that can be urged on the other side weak and futile. He cannot in a matter of
importance neutralize his feelings: perfect impartiality can be the result only of
indifference. He does not perhaps seem to dictate, but he wishes gently to guide his
pupil; and that wish is seldom disappointed. The child adopts the
opinion of his parent, and seems to himself to have adopted it from the decisions of
his own judgement; but all these reasonings must be gone over again, and these
opinions undergo a fiery ordeal, if ever he comes really to think and determine for
himself.
2. The fact is, that no man, whatever his system may be, refrains from instilling
prejudices into his child in any matter he has much at heart. Take a disciple of
Rousseau, who contends that it would be very pernicious to give his son any ideas of
a Deity till he is of an age to read Clarke or Leibnitz, and ask him if he waits so
long to impress on his mind the sentiments of patriotism -- the civic affection. O
no! you will find his little heart is early taught to beat at the very name of
liberty, and that, long before he is capable of forming a single political idea, he
has entered with warmth into all the party sentiments and connexions of his parent.
He learns to love and hate, to venerate or despise, by rote; and he soon acquires
decided opinions, of the real ground of which he can know absolutely nothing. Are
not ideas of female honour and decorum imprest first as prejudices; and would any
parent wish they should be so much as canvassed till the most settled habits of
propriety have rendered it safe to do it? In teaching first by prejudice that which
is afterwards to be proved, we do but follow
Nature. Instincts are the
prejudices she gives us: we follow them implicitly, and they lead us right; but it
is not till long afterwards that reason comes and justifies them. Why should we
scruple to lead a child to right opinions in the same way by which Nature leads him
to right practices!
3. Still it will be urged that man is a rational being, and therefore reason is the
only true ground of belief, and authority is not reason. This point requires a
little discussion. That he who receives a truth upon authority has not a reasonable
belief, is in one sense true, since he has not drawn it from the result of his own
inquiries; but in another it is certainly false, since the authority itself may be
to him the best of all reasons for believing it. There are few men who, from the
exercise of the best powers of their minds, could derive so good a reason for
believing a mathematical truth as the authority of Sir Isaac Newton. There are two
principles deeply implanted in the mind of man, without which he could never attain
knowledge, -- curiosity, and credulity; the former to lead him to make discoveries
himself, the latter to dispose him to receive knowledge from others. The credulity
of a child to those who cherish him is in early life unbounded. This is one of the
most useful instincts he has, and is in fact a precious advantage put into the hands
of the parent for storing his mind with ideas of all kinds.
Without
this principle of assent he could never gain even the rudiments of knowledge. He
receives it, it is true, in the shape of prejudice; but the prejudice itself is
founded upon sound reasoning, and conclusive though imperfect experiment. He finds
himself weak, helpless, and ignorant; he sees in his parent a being of knowledge and
powers more than his most capacity can fathom; almost a god to him. He has often
done him good, therefore he believes he loves him; he finds him capable of giving
him information upon all the subjects he has applied to him about; his knowledge
seems unbounded, and his information has led him right whenever he has had occasion
to try it by actual experiment: the child does not draw out his little reasonings
into a logical form, but this is to him a ground of belief, that his parent knows
every thing, and is infallible. Though the proposition is not exactly true, it is
sufficiently so for him to act upon: and when he believes in his parent with
implicit faith, he believes upon grounds as truly rational as when, in after life,
he follows the deductions of his own reason.
4. But you will say, I wish my son may have nothing to unlearn, and therefore I would
have him wait to form an opinion till he is able to do it on solid grounds. And why
do you suppose he will have less to unlearn if he follows his own reason than if he
followed yours? If he thinks, if he in-
quires, he will not doubt have
a great deal to unlearn, whichever course you take with him; but it is better to
have some things to unlearn, than to have nothing learnt. Do you hold your own
opinions so loosely, so hesitatingly, as not to think them safer to abide by than
the first results of his stammering reason? Are there no truths to learn so
indubitable as to be without fear of their not approving themselves to his mature
and well-directed judgement? Are there none you esteem so useful as to feel anxious
that he be put in possession of them? We are solicitous not only to put our children
in a capacity of acquiring their daily bread, but to bequeath to them riches which
they may receive as an inheritance. Have you no mental wealth you wish to transmit,
no stock of ideas he may begin with, instead of drawing them all from the labour of
his own brain? If, moreover, your son should not adopt your prejudices, he will
certainly adopt those of other people; or, if on subjects of high interest he
could be kept totally indifferent, the consequence would be, that
he would conceive either that such matters were not worth the trouble of inquiry, or
that nothing satisfactory was to be learnt about them: for there are negative
prejudices as well as positive.
5. Let parents, therefore, not scruple to use the power of God and Nature have put into
their hands for the advantage of their offspring. Let them
not fear to
impress them with prejudices for whatever is fair and honourable in action --
whatever is useful and important in systematic truth. Let such prejudices be wrought
into the very texture of the soul. Such truths let them appear to know by intuition.
Let the child never remember the period when he did not know them. Instead of
sending him to that cold and hesitating belief which is founded on the painful and
uncertain consequences of late investigation, let his conviction of all the truths
you deem important be mixed up with every warm affection of his nature, and
identified with his most cherished recollections -- the time will come soon enough
when his confidence in you will have received a check. The growth of his own reason
and the development of his powers will lead him with a sudden impetus to examine
every thing, to canvass every thing, to suspect every thing. If he finds, as he
certainly will find, the results of his reasoning different in some respects from
those you have given him, far from being now disposed to receive your assertions as
proofs, he will rather feel disinclined to any opinion you profess, and struggle to
free himself from the net you have woven about him.
6. The calm repose of his mind is broken, the placid lake is become turbid, and
reflects distorted and broken images of things; but be not you
alarmed
at the new workings of his thoughts, -- it is the angel of reason which descends and
troubles the waters. To endeavour to influence by authority would be as useless now
as it was salutary before. Lie by in silence, and wait the result. Do not expect the
mind of your son is to resemble yours, as your figure is reflected by the image in
the glass; he was formed, like you, to use his own judgement, and he claims the high
privilege of his nature. His reason is mature, his mind must now form itself. Happy
must you esteem yourself, if amidst all lesser differences of opinion, and the wreck
of many of your favourite ideas, he still preserves those radical and primary truths
which are essential to his happiness, and which different trains of thought and
opposite modes of investigation will very often equally lead to.
7. Let it be well remembered that we have only been recommending those prejudices which
go before reason, not those which are contrary to it. To endeavour to make children,
or others over whom we have influence, receive systems which we do not believe,
merely because it is convenient to ourselves that they should believe them, though a
very fashionable practice, makes no part of the discipline we plead for. These are
not prejudices, but impositions. We may also grant that nothing should be received
as a prejudice which can be
easily made the subject of experiment. A
child may be allowed to find out for himself that boiling water will scald his
fingers, and mustard bite his tongue; but he must be prejudiced against
ratsbane, because the experiment would be too costly. In like manner it may do him
good to have experienced that little instances of inattention or perverseness draw
upon him the displeasure of his parent: but that profligacy is attended with loss of
character, is a truth one would rather wish him to take upon trust.
8. There is no occasion to inculcate by prejudices those truths which it is of no
importance for us to know till our powers are able to investigate them. Thus the
metaphysical questions of space and time, necessity and free-will, and a thousand
others, may safely be left for that age which delights in such discussions. They
have no connexion with conduct; and none have any business with them at all but
those who are able by such studies to exercise and sharpen their mental powers: but
it is not so with those truths on which our well-being depends; these must be taught
to all, not only before they can reason upon them, but independently of the
consideration whether they will ever be able to reason upon them as long as they
live. What has hitherto been said relates only to instilling prejudices into
others; how far a man is to allow them in himself, or, as a celebrated
writer expresses it, to cherish them, is a different question, on which
perhaps I may some time offer my thoughts.1 In the mean time I cannot help
concluding, that to reject the influence of prejudice in education is itself one of
the most unreasonable of prejudices.
1. It is to be regretted that Mrs. Barbauld never fulfilled the intention here
intimated. -- EDITOR [i.e., Lucy Aikin]. Back
Date: 1825
(revised 02/08/2005) Author: Anna Letitia Barbauld
(revised Zach Weir).
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